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Abstract 
This paper empirically examines the impact of temporary agency work strategies on 
firm performance using panel data from German establishments. Thereby, special 
attention is devoted to the question, whether there are performance differences be-
tween establishments using temporary agency workers (TAWs) as a buffer stock 
(flexibility strategy) and establishments testing TAWs for permanent positions 
(screening strategy). Theoretically, there are good reasons for using one strategy as 
well as adopting the other. On the other hand, however, both strategies may also be 
associated with serious drawbacks to be borne by the establishments. Our empirical 
analysis suggests that establishments following the flexibility strategy perform signifi-
cantly worse than establishments following the screening strategy. Hence, we con-
clude that employers act in their own interest, if they credibly consider temporary 
workers for permanent jobs instead of implementing a system of first- and second-
class employees.  
 
JEL Classification: C23; J24; J42; J82; M55 
Keywords: Temporary agency work, firm performance, flexibility strategy, screening 
strategy 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, the growth in the temporary agency work industry has been tremen-
dous – irrespective of the level of employment protection legislation (EPL). For ex-
ample, both Germany (with a rather high level of EPL) and the USA (with a rather 
low level of EPL) have witnessed a huge growth in the number of temporary agency 
workers (TAWs) over the last two decades. Between 1994 and 2008 the number of 
TAWs employed in German firms increased from about 135,000 to 800,000 corre-
sponding to 2.9 % of the total workforce. Just during the last year of this time period 
the TAW growth was at about 70,000 individuals. In the USA the number of TAWs 
increased from about one million in 1992 to 2.9 million in 2005 corresponding to 2.6 
% of total employment (Antoni and Jahn, 2009; Jahn, 2010; Mitlacher, 2007). In try-
ing to explain this development, literature points to changes in external forces boost-
ing the demand for TAWs. These changes contain a growing competition and the 
need for flexibility and cutting costs, a distinct EPL, which can be avoided by em-
ploying TAWs, and deregulation tendencies in the temporary agency sector relaxing 
the requirements to employ TAWs (e.g., Kirk and Belovics, 2008; Chen and Funke, 
2009; MacPhail and Bowles, 2008).  
 
We refer to temporary work as the triangular relationship between a TAW, a tempo-
rary work agency and a client establishment, whose performance is being examined in 
this paper. The agency is the de jure employer of the worker. Therefore, the agency 
pays the wage and keeps disciplinary authority over the TAW (Mitlacher, 2005). The 
agency lends the TAW to a client firm, which in turn pays a fee to the agency. 
Therefore, the client firm has managerial authority over the TAW. Temporary work 
agencies help to reduce transaction costs (e.g., search costs and bargaining costs) be-
tween client firms and workers.1 Additionally, temporary work agencies can specialize 
in human resources tasks such as improving hiring tests or attracting a larger pool of 
candidates.  
 
                                                 
1 For example, client firms do not need to place an advertisement in a newspaper or on the internet. 
Furthermore, they do not necessarily need to interview and sometimes even select applicants. These 
(pre-)selection activities are typically delegated to the temporary work agencies.  
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There are two main reasons why client firms hire TAWs: flexibility and screening.2 
For example, firms can use TAWs to meet short-term fluctuations in demand flexibly 
and at low cost. In this case, TAWs serve as a buffer stock allowing short-term em-
ployment adjustments without affecting permanent employees. On the other hand, 
firms can also use TAWs to screen workers before hiring them on a permanent basis. 
Here, firms signal a long-term interest to TAWs, because temporary work may con-
stitute a stepping stone into permanent employment. As a consequence, therefore, 
both the flexibility and the screening strategy appear to be quite beneficial human 
resources strategies that may have positive effects on firm performance.  
 
However, one may also raise serious doubts regarding the beneficial performance ef-
fects of TAW use. For example, firms using TAWs as a buffer stock internally im-
plement a segmented labour market consisting of permanent core workers and flexible 
temporary workers, whose employment opportunities are subject to demand fluctua-
tions. This could impair the motivation of TAWs and thus firm performance. Analo-
gously, the screening strategy may also involve adverse firm performance effects, 
when permanent employees feel threatened to be replaced by hard working TAWs. In 
this case, permanent workers are likely to reduce their willingness to cooperate with 
TAWs.  
 
This a-priori open performance situation constitutes the objective of our paper. Fo-
cussing on establishments that apply temporary agency work, we are interested in 
examining the issue of whether there are performance differences between establish-
ments using TAWs as a buffer stock and establishments that use them for screening 
purposes. To the best of our knowledge, this question has not been tackled by other 
studies before. Note that we do not aim at estimating the performance effects of tem-
porary agency work in general. This has recently been done, for example, by Arvani-
tis (2005), Kleinknecht et al. (2006), Bryson (2007), and Hirsch and Mueller (2010) 
coming to mixed or insignificant results.3  
                                                 
2 The discussion for TAWs is quite similar to the discussion regarding the employment of fixed-term 
workers. In the following, therefore, we additionally consider the literature on the motives and per-
formance effects of fixed-term workers to be relevant for our analysis.  
3 For example, Hirsch and Mueller (2010) find a hump-shaped relationship between TAW use and 
establishment productivity. Furthermore, one main result of Bryson (2007) is that a modest TAW use 
(1-4 % of the workforce) has a positive impact on relative labour productivity. 
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In our study, we use data of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) Estab-
lishment Panel (waves 2002-2007). Our empirical model is based on an augmented 
Cobb-Douglas production function. Furthermore, our estimation strategy accounts for 
unobserved establishment characteristics and other potential sources of endogeneity, 
so the parameter estimates can be viewed as causal effects. In the end, therefore, our 
estimation results allow the derivation of management implications for the effective 
use of TAWs. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
background of this study. In Section 3 we briefly discuss the related empirical litera-
ture. Section 4 contains our empirical investigation. The robustness of our results is 
checked in the sensitivity analysis of Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
The employment of TAWs may be economically interesting for client firms for at 
least two reasons (Forde et al., 2008). First, the use of TAWs enables firms to meet 
their flexibility requirements more effectively than the alternative employment of 
permanent workers. Second, the use of TAWs provides firms with an additional 
screening device to reduce the typical pre-contractual principal agent information 
problem with respect to the abilities and motivation of the workers to be recruited. In 
this sense, the employment of TAWs serves as a prolonged probation period, in which 
the firm has the opportunity to obtain the necessary information. We refer to the 
first motive for employing TAWs as flexibility strategy, while we call the second mo-
tive just mentioned screening strategy.  
 
The use of TAWs may increase the flexibility of client firms, because TAWs allow 
these firms to rapidly respond to demand fluctuations and staff shortages (Kirk and 
Belovics, 2008). For example, in times of labour shortage temporary work agencies 
are able to provide the firms concerned with TAWs in the short run. In this way, the 
flexible use of TAWs allows firms to maintain an uninterrupted production. This is 
important not only because production technology can be applied continuously and at 
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high capacity, but also because customers can be served in due time (Bryson, 2007). 
Additionally, in times of increasing demand firms may prefer to extend their work-
force employing TAWs instead of permanent employees, because the separation from 
TAWs is usually much easier than the dismissal of permanent employees, when de-
mand declines. Hence, employing TAWs offers firms an opportunity to flexibly adjust 
their workforce in response to demand requirements. The flexibility argument is even 
amplified in countries with a high level of EPL, since employing TAWs instead of 
permanent workers allows firms to save dismissal costs. Specifically, TAWs can easily 
be dismissed without dismissal costs returning the TAWs to the temporary work 
agency, while the dismissal of permanent employees typically requires the adherence 
of cancellation periods and substantial severance payments. Finally, firms employing 
TAWs are able to realize cost benefits relative to employing permanent workers. A 
direct cost advantage results from the fact that TAWs typically receive significantly 
lower wages than permanent workers (Jahn, 2010; Oberst et al., 2007), while an indi-
rect beneficial cost effect can be achieved by putting pressure on the wages of all em-
ployees (Bryson, 2007). Summing up, these benefits of flexibility are likely to have a 
positive effect on firm performance.  
 
On the other hand, firms following the flexibility motive internally implement a seg-
mented labour market consisting of privileged permanent employees in a secure posi-
tion and precarious TAWs sitting in a trap. Moreover, TAWs usually experience 
lower wages, poorer working conditions and less training than permanent employees 
(Nienhueser and Matiaske, 2006). When TAWs recognize that permanent workers 
executing similar tasks are privileged with respect to important job characteristics, 
this perception of relative job discrimination could reduce TAWs’ effort, motivation 
and productivity and may even deteriorate the cooperation with permanent employ-
ees. Following this line of reasoning, the flexibility strategy is likely to have a nega-
tive effect on firm performance.  
 
Alternatively, by following a screening strategy a firm may increase the motivation, 
effort level and productivity of TAWs (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005). The reason 
for this is that – contrary to the flexibility strategy – the screening strategy includes 
the opportunity of a long-term perspective for the TAWs. While in firms following 
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the flexibility motive temporary work can be thought of as being a ‘dead end’ for the 
TAWs concerned, it may serve as a ‘stepping stone’ for TAWs working in firms fol-
lowing the screening motive (Jahn and Rosholm, 2010; Barbieri and Sestito, 2008; 
Booth et al., 2002).4 In these firms, namely, TAWs are initially employed under the 
usual conditions of temporary agency work, but they are offered a permanent job af-
ter having proven high abilities. This option may enhance the TAWs’ motivation and 
effort level.  
 
The rationale for applying the screening strategy can be explained using standard 
results of information economics and tournament theory (e.g., Lazear and Gibbs, 
2009; Garibaldi, 2006). For example, it is well-known that employers usually face a 
pre-contractual information problem with respect to unobserved individual worker 
characteristics, such as ability and motivation. The employment of TAWs may repre-
sent a possible solution to this information problem. Initially employing workers on a 
temporary basis enables the firm to gain the required information, and thus, contrib-
utes to reduce the cost of wrong employment decisions. If a TAW is positively evalu-
ated after the screening period, he will be promoted to a permanent position, while he 
has to leave the firm in the converse case of a negative evaluation. As a result, the 
average quality of the workforce will rise, which should in turn have a positive effect 
on firm performance. In addition, it is also well-known that promotion tournaments 
are intended to encourage workers to spend high effort, when the winner prize is high 
relative to the loser prize. In the present case, there is a winner-takes-all situation, 
because the positively evaluated TAWs are offered a permanent job, while the nega-
tively evaluated TAWs have to leave the firm. Hence, the wage differential between 
positively and negatively evaluated TAWs is likely to be sufficiently large to generate 
high effort levels among the competing TAWs. As a consequence, the screening strat-
egy is supposed to have a positive effect on firm performance.   
 
On the other hand, applying the screening strategy may also be associated with sub-
stantial drawbacks calling the reasoning just mentioned into question. For example, 
permanent workers may perceive the job tournament among the TAWs as a threat 
for their own jobs, which virtually should be quite secure by definition (Bryson, 
                                                 
4 The terms ‘dead end’ and ‘stepping stone’ can be ascribed to Booth et al. (2002).  
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2007).5 More precisely, permanent workers may worry about their own jobs, because 
they cannot definitely rule out the possibility to be replaced by successful TAWs, 
even if this is not the primary intention of the up or out-tournament. In this case, 
peer relations are likely to suffer because permanent workers might refuse to cooper-
ate with TAWs (Chattopadhyay and George, 2001). Hence, work organization could 
substantially be affected. Furthermore, worker-manager relations and the loyalty be-
tween those two parties could also worsen, encouraging permanent employees to quit, 
and thus, increasing the turnover rate of the firm (Davis-Blake et al., 2003). As a 
consequence, these negative spill-over effects on permanent employees may involve a 
negative effect on firm performance.6  
 
All in all, the theoretical discussion with respect to the effect of TAWs on firm per-
formance is heterogeneous. Both the flexibility strategy and the screening strategy 
may be associated with positive or negative performance effects, while the relative 
effect of the two strategies remains an open question. Our empirical analysis, there-
fore, aims at shedding light on this issue. More precisely, we estimate whether there 
are performance differences between establishments following the flexibility strategy 
and those following the screening strategy. Before turning to the empirical analysis, 
however, we provide a brief review of the related empirical literature.  
 
3. Related literature 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, several authors empirically investigate the produc-
tivity effects of temporary agency work at the establishment or firm level. Moreover, 
some studies even address the potential benefits of the screening strategy, however, 
without explicitly relating it to the flexibility strategy. For example, Erickcek et al. 
(2002) conduct case studies of 18 Midwestern firms in the manufacturing, health care 
and education sector. The authors find that temporary agency work involves less 
negative or even positive consequences for TAWs, if the client firm follows a screen-
                                                 
5 This point is further examined by other studies. For instance, Kraimer et al. (2005) explore the role 
of regular employees’ perceived job security in explaining their perceptions that TAWs pose a threat 
to their jobs. Moreover, Svensson and Wolvén (2010) found that TAWs also form a psychological con-
tract (according to Rousseau, 1989) with their co-workers and not only with the hiring organization.  
6 Adverse effects of increasing TAW use on regular employees have recently been found by De Cuyper 
et al. (2009). 
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ing strategy, which includes the option of a long-term perspective for the TAWs. 
Moreover, Tan and Tan (2002) empirically examine the determinants of job satisfac-
tion among 141 TAWs of four Singaporean temporary work agencies. They find that 
involuntary TAWs – i.e., those TAWs that actually prefer a permanent job, but have 
provisionally accepted a contract with a temporary work agency – work extra hard in 
order to signal their capabilities.  
 
On the basis of 174 TAWs of a Midwestern agency, Ellingson et al. (1998) find that 
involuntary TAWs indeed exhibit a lower level of satisfaction than voluntary TAWs. 
Their productivity, however, is not significantly affected. Similarly, by examining 
data on 2,418 TAWs from two large staffing agencies in the US, George et al. (2010) 
find that involuntary TAWs exhibit a higher level of extra-role behaviour towards 
the client firm. None of these studies mention the screening strategy explicitly, but 
there seems to be an evident relationship. Finally, De Cuyper et al. (2009) empirically 
predict the job insecurity climate among 216 Belgian and 404 Spanish permanent 
workers in firms that follow either supplementation or substitution motives when us-
ing TAWs (and other types of temporary employment). The authors’ estimates pro-
vide mixed results on the effect of supplementation motives. However, some substitu-
tion motives increase permanent workers’ job insecurity climate in the Belgian sam-
ple, thereby suggesting motive-specific adverse effects. 
 
Given these mixed and less clear-cut results, the empirical evidence so far is not able 
to shed light on the role that a specific strategy regarding the use of TAWs might 
have in explaining potential firm performance differences. Furthermore, it must be 
mentioned that the previously discussed studies suffer from various methodological 
problems as typical endogeneity issues resulting from an establishment’s use of tem-
porary agency work are neglected. For example, none of the studies accounts for un-
observed firm characteristics that may substantially bias the estimation results. 
Moreover, the studies do also not address the problems of reverse causality and selec-
tivity. However, firm performance is also likely to influence the applied strategy in 
terms of TAW use (flexibility vs. screening), not just vice versa. For example, firms 
facing short-term fluctuations in sales may prefer employing TAWs as a flexibility 
device instead of hiring permanent employees. Additionally, rather than being ran-
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domly assigned to TAW status firms are also likely to have good reasons of whether 
or not to employ TAWs at all. Not controlling for reverse causality and establish-
ment self-selection would be associated with the risk of obtaining biased and inconsis-
tent parameter estimates.  
 
Therefore, an important objective of our empirical investigation is to control for un-
observed establishment characteristics and other endogeneity issues using panel data 
and applying appropriate estimation methods. Contrary to previous studies, we 
thereby aim at discriminating between the performance effects of establishments fol-
lowing the flexibility strategy relative to establishments following the screening strat-
egy. In this sense, our paper should add quite substantially to the empirical literature 
on the effects of temporary agency work on firm performance. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1. Data, variables and descriptive statistics 
 
In our study, we use the data of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) Estab-
lishment Panel. The IAB Establishment Panel is an annual survey of over 15,000 es-
tablishments in Germany. The establishments are selected from a parent sample of all 
German establishments that employ at least one employee covered by social security. 
This parent sample can be considered as complete, because establishments have to 
report on their employees under social security by law. The selection method is strati-
fication with respect to ten categories of establishment size and 16 economic sectors. 
This is why an establishment’s probability of being selected increases with employ-
ment. Hence, the IAB Establishment Panel is approximately proportional to em-
ployment and therefore representative for the German economy. A large set of infor-
mation is provided periodically, such as information about employment and wages, 
sales, investments, export activities, technical innovations, organizational change, 
worker representation or vocational and continuous training. Additionally, some top-
ics are covered by the questionnaire in selected years. For example, temporary agency 
work is covered quite extensively in the year 2003.  
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The dependent variable of our analysis is the natural logarithm of value added (de-
fined as total sales minus material costs) measured in Euro ( VAln ). Value added is 
the most prominent productivity measure in studies on establishment performance. 
Our key explanatory variables are dummy variables indicating whether an establish-
ment uses temporary agency work either for flexibility reasons (FLEX ), as a screen-
ing device (SCREEN ), or whether it follows a dual strategy combining both strate-
gies ( SCREENFLEX  ). Note that only those establishments employing TAWs at 
all are considered in this analysis. Establishments are regarded to follow the flexibil-
ity strategy, if they have recently adjusted their workforce using TAWs to meet un-
expected fluctuations in demand or production. On the other hand, establishments 
are regarded to follow the screening strategy, if they have recently promoted TAWs 
to permanent positions. Hence, the corresponding questions in the questionnaire allow 
for a direct classification of establishments without relying on indirect indicator vari-
ables.  
 
The choice of our control variables is quite typical in a production function frame-
work. Of course, we apply proxies for the Cobb-Douglas input factors, i.e., the natu-
ral logarithm of total investments as an indicator for capital stock ( Kln ) and the 
natural logarithm of total employment as an indicator for labour ( Lln ). Further-
more, we augment the Cobb-Douglas specification with control variables capturing 
the structure of the workforce, technical and organizational innovations, product in-
novations, international trade activities, the existence of institutions for worker repre-
sentation, the existence of profit sharing or stock ownership plans, the incidence of 
continuous training, and other establishment characteristics. Finally, we add controls 
for regional and sector affiliation7 as well as a set of time dummies. It is important to 
note that our key explanatory variables as well as some of the control variables are 
only available in one panel wave (year 2004),8 because this data limitation has conse-
quences for our estimation strategy. Table A1 in the appendix displays the definitions 
and descriptive statistics of the complete set of variables used in this study. 
                                                 
7 We exclude the public sector as well as the banking and insurance sector. The reason for excluding 
banks and insurance companies is that their productivity measure is based on total assets instead of 
total sales. The public sector is excluded because we cannot necessarily assume a profit maximizing 
behaviour of the concerned institutions.  
8 We transferred the strategy dummy variables FLEX, SCREEN and FLEXSCREEN, which origi-
nally were available in the wave 2003, to 2004. Thereby, we assume that an establishment does not 
change its TAW related strategy completely during 12 months.  
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All in all, our sample contains 746 establishments9 employing TAWs and providing 
information on their adopted TAW strategies. About 19 % of these establishments 
apply the flexibility strategy, i.e., they employ TAWs to meet unexpected fluctua-
tions in demand or production. About 14 % of the establishments use TAWs as a 
screening device and offer long-term perspectives for those workers that passed this 
kind of probation period as a TAW. Finally, about 7 % of the establishments usually 
combine both strategies.  
 
4.2. Econometric Model  
 
Our objective in this paper is to examine the performance effects of different firm 
strategies regarding the use of TAWs. Thereby, we are particularly interested in an-
swering the question whether establishments adopting a flexibility strategy are more 
or less successful than establishments following a screening strategy. Irrespective of 
the question whether the use of temporary agency work is beneficial at all, there may 
be substantial performance differences within the group of TAW employing estab-
lishments that depend on the respective strategy underlying TAW use.  
 
In order to detect potential benefits of the flexibility or the screening strategy, we 
augment a conventional Cobb-Douglas production function for the sub-sample of es-
tablishments employing TAWs by the strategy dummy variables introduced above.10 
Thus, our baseline estimation equation is 
  
,
lnlnln 32121
ittiit
itititititit
uvX
SCREENFLEXSCREENFLEXLKVA




 (1) 
 
where X  is a vector of control variables and u  is an error term with zero mean and 
finite variance. Moreover, t  represents cyclical fluctuations captured by a set of time 
                                                 
9 The sample size is subject to the definition of the dependent variable. For example, when we use 
total sales instead of value added as dependent variable in our sensitivity analysis, sample size in-
creases to 833 establishments.  
10 Hence, the reference group is characterized by establishments responding to apply none of these 
strategies.  
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dummies and iv  is a time-invariant establishment-specific fixed effect. Finally, the 
indexes i  and t  characterizes establishment and time, respectively. The parameters 
of interest to be estimated are 1 , 2  and 3 . 
 
Estimating equation (1) by conventional OLS is likely to involve serious estimation 
biases, because OLS ignores various endogeneity issues that may result from the use 
of the TAW strategy variables. First, cross-sectional and pooled OLS estimations can 
be biased and inconsistent, if some time-invariant unobserved factors iv  influence the 
dependent variable and one or more explanatory variables simultaneously. In this 
case, the concerned explanatory variables can no longer be considered as exogenous, 
which involves inconsistent OLS parameter estimates. A prominent example for un-
observed establishment characteristics is management quality. Provided that man-
agement quality influences both, i.e., productivity and the adopted strategy in terms 
of TAW use, our strategy variables in equation (1) cannot be assumed to be exoge-
nous. The conventional proceeding in this case would be to exploit the panel struc-
ture of the data and estimate a fixed effects model.  
  
Since the strategy variables and some of the control variables are only available in 
one year, we cannot estimate a standard fixed effects model to address the issue of 
unobserved establishment characteristics. However, an appropriate solution in this 
case has been proposed by Black and Lynch (2001).11 Their two-step estimation pro-
cedure allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity in a situation, where the 
core explanatory variables are only available in one panel wave.  
 
The first step of the Black-Lynch approach consists of a within-estimation of a Cobb-
Douglas production function, which is augmented by year dummies T  to control for 
cyclical changes. Of course, the variables used in this first-step estimation must be 
available in more than just one year (here: 2002-2007). The first-step estimation 
equation can be written as 
 
.lnlnln 21 ititititit uvTLKVA         (2) 
                                                 
11 The Black-Lynch estimation approach has previously been applied, for example, in Zwick (2004; 
2005).  
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From the estimation of equation (2), the establishment fixed effect can be retrieved, 
i.e., 
 
,ˆlnˆlnˆlnˆ 21 TLKVAv iiii          (3) 
 
where the bars over the variables represent the corresponding mean values and the 
hats refer to estimated values. 
 
In the second step, this fixed effect is regressed on the strategy indicator variables 
FLEX , SCREEN , and SCREENFLEX   and a set of control variables X : 
 
,ˆ 321 iiiiii XSCREENFLEXSCREENFLEXv      (4) 
 
where i  is an i.i.d. random variable. The estimated coefficients 1 , 2  and 3  are 
adjusted from unobserved time-invariant establishment characteristics in the produc-
tion function (2). They represent the particular effects of the strategy variables 
FLEX , SCREEN , and SCREENFLEX   on the fixed effect of an establishment’s 
productivity.  
 
The Black-Lynch approach addresses only one particular form of endogeneity, namely 
unobserved heterogeneity. However, as discussed above, other sources of endogeneity 
might occur, which refer to a correlation of our strategy variables with the error term 
itu  in equation (1), i.e., reverse causality and sample selection. For example, an es-
tablishment’s particular strategy underlying the use of TAWs can not only be as-
sumed to influence establishment performance, but may also be driven by establish-
ment performance. As mentioned earlier, establishments that usually have to cope 
with short-term demand fluctuations are likely to employ TAWs instead of perma-
nent employees in order to gain more flexibility. Moreover, performance issues as well 
as other observed and unobserved characteristics might determine an establishment’s 
decision whether or not to employ TAWs at all. These potential endogeneity sources 
are likely to bias the parameter estimates unless the estimation method appropriately 
takes them into account.  
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In order to control for the potential endogeneity of the strategy indicator variables, 
while simultaneously considering the binary nature of these variables, we adopt a 
two-step endogeneity correction introduced by Dubin and McFadden (1984) and re-
cently applied, for example, in Origo and Pagani (2009). Following this procedure, we 
firstly generate a new multinomial strategy variable STRAT  using the strategy 
dummy variables introduced above, i.e., 
 











.otherwise,4
1 if,3
1 if,2
1 if,1
ii
i
i
i
SCREENFLEX
SCREEN
FLEX
STRAT       (5) 
 
Hence, iSTRAT  captures the choice of establishment i  with regard to j  ( j 1, 2, 3, 
4) considered strategies of TAW use. We can now estimate a model of strategy choice 
specifying the following multinomial logit model12 
 
     .lnlnexp
lnlnexp
,ln,ln|Pr 4
1 21
21
  

k ikikik
ijijij
iiiiij
ZLK
ZLK
ZLKjSTRATP 

 (6) 
 
Here, Z  is a vector of observable characteristics with ][ IXZ  , where I  is an identi-
fying instrumental variable which is additionally included in order not only to rely on 
the functional form assumptions for identification. By means of equation (6) a set of 
correction terms can be calculated to be used as additional control variables in equa-
tion (4). According to Dubin and McFadden (1984), the correction terms are ob-
tained by  
 
  .ln
1
ln|
4

 kj ijik
ikik
iiij PP
PPjSTRATEc       (7) 
                                                 
12 In order to ensure model identification, j1 , j2  and j  have to be set to zero for one of the strat-
egy regimes. The estimated coefficients are then interpreted relative to this regime.  
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The first three correction terms )1|(1  iii STRATEc  , )2|(2  iii STRATEc  , 
and )3|(3  iii STRATEc  , i.e., one term for each endogenous binary explanatory 
variable, are then added to the second-stage estimation of the Black-Lynch proce-
dure, so equation (4) augments to 
 
.ˆ 321 iiiiiii cXSCREENFLEXSCREENFLEXv     (8) 
 
Significant parameters in   would indicate that the endogeneity problem is not ex-
clusively solved by accounting for fixed effects in the production function, so the cor-
rection according to Dubin and McFadden (1984) is essential to eliminate any re-
maining endogeneity bias. Hence, the two-stage estimation approach derived in equa-
tions (5)-(8) assures unbiased and consistent estimates of the parameters of interest, 
i.e., 1 , 2  and 3 , which can then be interpreted as causal effects. On the other 
hand, if the parameter estimates   turn out to be insignificant, the Black-Lynch ap-
proach according to equations (2)-(4) would be sufficient to obtain unbiased and con-
sistent estimates of 1 , 2  and 3 .  
 
Finally, our estimation approach calls for some explanations concerning the identifi-
cation strategy. Contrary to conventional instrumental variables estimation tech-
niques like two-stage least squares, the Dubin-McFadden approach does not necessar-
ily require one or more strictly exogenous variables that are correlated with the po-
tential endogenous explanatory variables but uncorrelated with the error term of the 
estimation equation of interest. However, in order to improve the efficiency of pa-
rameter estimates, the identification of suitable exclusion restrictions is typically rec-
ommended. In the present case, therefore, we should identify at least one exclusion 
restriction to be correlated with ijP  without having a direct influence on value added, 
given the specified covariates.13  
 
                                                 
13 Note that although there are originally three explanatory dummy variables to be instrumented, we 
actually do not need likewise three exclusion restrictions that determine ijP . 
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In the present case, we use a dummy variable indicating whether or not an estab-
lishment currently offers apprenticeship training as an exclusion restriction in equa-
tion (6). The rationale behind using this dummy variable is that the incidence of ap-
prenticeship training is likely to be inconsistent with both the flexibility strategy and 
the screening strategy. Recall that in Germany apprenticeship training is usually 
firm-sponsored, i.e., training firms face net costs during the training period, while 
their subsequent returns to apprenticeship training are insecure (e.g., Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 1999; Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009). In this scenario, establishments ap-
plying the flexibility strategy are likely to desist from offering apprenticeship training, 
because their flexibility requirements may not fit well to the long-term perspective 
implied by human capital investments. On the other hand, establishments using tem-
porary agency work as a screening device may indeed be interested in long-term em-
ployment relationships. However, due to the substantial net costs associated with 
firm-sponsored training, they might prefer testing TAWs for this purpose rather than 
apprentices. As a consequence, we assume that establishments following a certain 
strategy with regard to their TAW use are less likely to offer apprenticeship training 
than establishments following neither the flexibility nor the screening strategy.14 
 
4.3. Estimation Results 
 
Table 1 displays the results of the three specifications elaborated above: a cross-
section OLS model that serves as a reference, a model using the Black-Lynch proce-
dure, and a model using the Black-Lynch procedure extended by the endogeneity cor-
rection according to Dubin and McFadden (1984).15 First of all, looking at the first-
stage estimates displayed in Table A2 in the appendix, we see that our exclusion re-
striction is significant with the anticipated negative sign in two of the three multino-
mial logit model equations. Furthermore, a diagnostic 2  test strongly rejects the 
null hypothesis that the exclusion restriction is jointly insignificant in all three equa-
                                                 
14 This reasoning applies to the group of TAWs employing establishments. Note that herewith we do 
not rule out a potential complementary relationship between apprenticeship training and TAW use.   
15 The estimates of the input factors and the covariates not displayed in Table 1 are available from the 
authors upon request. The corresponding first-stage estimates of the main explanatory variables are 
displayed in Table A2 in the appendix. The estimates of the remaining covariates in the multinomial 
logit model are available from the authors upon request. 
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tions displayed. Hence, we conclude that our applied exclusion restriction meets the 
required condition of instrument relevance.  
 
Since applying the Dubin-McFadden approach entails a deviation from the conven-
tional instrumental variables estimation strategy by means of two-stage least squares, 
we cannot directly test whether or not our exclusion restriction also meets the second 
validity condition, i.e, the exogeneity assumption. However, we can check whether or 
not our exclusion restriction has a direct influence on value added. If the apprentice-
ship dummy was insignificant in the cross sectional version of production function (1) 
and if adding this dummy did not alter the estimates of the other covariates substan-
tially, we would have an indication for our exclusion restriction to be exogenous.16 In 
fact, we find that the apprenticeship dummy turns out to be insignificant in the pro-
duction function ( 371.0p ) without changing the remaining parameter estimates 
noticeably. All in all, therefore, we consider our exclusion restriction to be sufficiently 
valid.   
 
Now, turning to the estimation results displayed in Table 1, we firstly see that the 
diagnostic F  test strongly indicates joint significance of the correction terms jc . This 
means that solely accounting for unobserved establishment characteristics by means 
of the Black-Lynch approach fails to eliminate the suspected endogeneity bias en-
tirely. In other words, correcting for any remaining endogeneity bias such as reverse 
causality and selectivity is strongly recommended. For this reason, our preferred 
specification is the Black-Lynch approach extended by an endogeneity correction ac-
cording to Dubin and McFadden (1984). This combined approach simultaneously 
takes unobserved establishment characteristics and remaining endogeneity issues into 
account.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
According to the endogeneity-corrected Black-Lynch estimates, establishments apply-
ing the flexibility strategy exhibit a significantly lower productivity level than the 
                                                 
16 An analogous proceeding with regard to testing the exogeneity assumption for an identifying instru-
mental variable in the absence of a formal test can be find, e.g., in Jirjahn (2010).  
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establishments in the reference category (i.e., establishments that do not follow any 
of the two strategies concerning temporary agency work), while the coefficients for 
establishments employing the screening or the dual strategy are insignificant. In order 
to assess the relative productivity effects of all TAW strategies considered, Table 1 
displays a set of F  tests that enable pairwise comparisons between the strategies in 
terms of their productivity effects. The main result of these F  tests is that the coeffi-
cient for FLEX  significantly differs from the coefficient for SCREEN ( 052.0p ). 
All in all, therefore, the point estimates joint with the F  test results confirm the 
relative productivity advantage of establishments that screen their TAWs for perma-
nent positions over establishments which use their TAWs as a pure flexibility device. 
The estimates for the Black-Lynch model are consistent with this interpretation as 
they also demonstrate the superiority of the screening strategy relative to the flexibil-
ity strategy.  
 
Hence, we can conclude that establishments following the screening strategy are likely 
to perform much better than establishments solely following the flexibility strategy. 
Based on our preferred specification displayed in the last column of Table 1, the pro-
ductivity differential is about 15 %. This estimate is slightly higher than the corre-
sponding productivity differential obtained from OLS (13 %) but considerably lower 
than the productivity differential obtained from the Black-Lynch approach, where the 
endogenous nature of the strategies in terms of TAW use is not explicitly addressed 
(23 %).  
 
Finally, it seems that the flexibility strategy does not harm an establishment’s pro-
ductivity, if it is accompanied by the screening strategy. Hence, if both strategies are 
used simultaneously in an establishment, the screening part obviously has the poten-
tial to outweigh the negative effects of the flexibility part.  
 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this section we conduct additional analyses that are intended to check the robust-
ness of our estimation results presented in the previous section. Thereby, we proceed 
in three steps. First, we examine the performance effects of establishments with a 
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flexibility strategy relative to establishments with a screening strategy applying two 
alternative performance measures instead of value added: total sales and profitability 
(defined as total sales divided by wage bill). Second, we specify an endogenous 
switching regression model as an alternative to the Dubin-McFadden approach to test 
whether our results are subject to the method of how to address the endogeneity 
problem. Finally, we check whether our results regarding the relative productivity 
disadvantage of the flexibility strategy are affected, when we change the exclusion 
restriction.  
 
5.1. Alternative performance measures 
 
In order to check whether or not our estimation results are subject to the perform-
ance measure used, we run the regressions reported in the previous section employing 
the natural logarithm of total sales ( Yln ) on the one hand and the natural logarithm 
of profitability (  WY /ln )17 on the other hand instead of VAln .18 The relative per-
formance differences of the TAW strategies are summarized in the first two columns 
of Table 2.19 Note that in the following we only present and discuss the estimates re-
sulting from our preferred model specification described by equations (5)-(8).  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The results support the estimates of our baseline model with the natural logarithm of 
value added as the dependent variable. Specifically, the estimates confirm a signifi-
cant performance disadvantage of the flexibility strategy relative to the screening 
strategy. Precisely, establishments adopting the flexibility strategy are about 23 % 
less productive in terms of total sales than establishments adopting the screening 
strategy. Similarly, flexibility establishments are about 17 % less profitable than 
                                                 
17 W denotes the yearly wage bill of the establishments considered.  
18 For example, one could argue that using value added instead of total sales is associated with a seri-
ous item non-response bias which is attributed to the fact that some establishments indeed provide 
information about their total sales but are unable or unwilling to provide information about their ma-
terial costs. The estimation results would suffer from an item non-response bias, if the sample size 
reduction caused by using value added instead of sales was non-randomly.  
19 The tables in this section contain only the key results. The remaining estimates are available from 
the authors upon request.  
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screening establishments. Finally, the dual strategy turns out to be beneficial relative 
to the flexibility strategy in terms of both total sales and profitability.20  
 
5.2. Alternative approach to account for selectivity 
 
The nature of our data allows for another estimation strategy to address endogeneity 
issues. Recall that our sample is restricted to establishments that employ at least one 
TAW. However, the vast majority of the establishments in our data set do not em-
ploy TAWs at all. Of course, there are good reasons for establishments whether or 
not to employ TAWs, so the decision regarding the employment of TAWs is unlikely 
to be random. In this subsection, we tackle the endogeneity problem regarding TAW 
use in a different manner compared to our proceeding in Section 4. More precisely, we 
account for a potential sample selection bias specifying an endogenous switching re-
gression model according to Madalla (1983) and using the estimated inverse Mill’s 
ratio as a selectivity correction term in equation (4).  
 
In a first step, we therefore estimate a conventional probit model 
 
    ,lnln,ln,ln|1Pr 21 iiiiiii ZLKZLKTEMP       (9) 
 
where TEMP  is a dummy variable capturing whether or not an establishment em-
ploys TAWs and    represents the standard normal distribution. The right hand 
side variables are identical to the regressors of the multinomial logit model (6) includ-
ing the identifying instrumental variable I  (i.e., the apprenticeship dummy) inte-
grated in Z . They capture the establishment characteristics that are relevant for the 
decision of whether to employ TAWs or not. 
 
Estimating equation (9) allows us to calculate the normal hazard function (inverse 
Mill’s ratio) which is finally added to equation (4) as a selectivity correction term for 
establishments with TAWs. Hence, our estimation model that simultaneously ac-
                                                 
20 Again, the exclusion restriction (apprenticeship dummy) turns out to be highly relevant in the first-
stage multinimial logit models. At first, in each case it is significant in two of the three equations. 
Moreover, the respective results of the diagnostic test of joint insignificance in all three equations are 
35.122  , 006.0p  and 81.112  , 008.0p . 
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counts for unobserved establishment characteristics in the production function and 
selectivity can be written as 
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Here, M  contains all the right hand side variables specified in equation (9).    rep-
resents the density function of the standard normal distribution, while      is 
inverse Mill’s ratio. The parameter   measures the covariance between the error 
terms in equation (4) and the selection equation (9). All in all, therefore, 1 , 2  and 
3 , can then be interpreted as causal effects. 
 
The estimation results of equation (10) are displayed in the third column of Table 2.21 
Most importantly, we obtain a significant productivity differential of about 24 % 
meaning that establishments following the screening strategy in terms of TAW use 
are about 24 % more productive than establishments following the flexibility strategy. 
According to the results of an F  test on 21   , this productivity differential is 
highly significant. Moreover, it is about 9 percentage points larger than the corre-
sponding productivity differential resulting from equation (8), where the Dubin-
McFadden endogeneity correction terms are added to the specification instead of in-
verse Mill’s ratio.22 We ascribe the deviating productivity gaps to the different esti-
mation strategies for dealing with the endogeneity problem. However, our main result 
is not at risk. Provided that establishments decide to employ TAWs, they are much 
better off with a screening strategy than with a flexibility strategy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The apprenticeship dummy used as the exclusion restriction in equation (9) is highly significant, 
where the estimated coefficient is 151.0I  ( 006.0p ).  
22 Note that the estimated coefficient for inverse Mill’s ratio is highly significant indicating the impor-
tance of accounting for selectivity. The negative sign of the selectivity correction term implies that 
especially establishments with a productivity advantage make use of employing TAWs.  
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5.3. Alternative instrumental variable 
 
Although the exclusion restriction is not very crucial for identifying the parameters in 
a scenario, where the Black-Lynch approach is combined with the Dubin-McFadden 
endogeneity correction method, we additionally check the robustness of our results 
displayed in the last column of Table 1 by using an alternative instrumental variable 
instead of the apprenticeship dummy. Since finding a convincing exclusion restriction 
is always a challenging task, we decided to apply an exclusion restriction which is 
related to our previously applied apprenticeship dummy. Hence, a natural candidate 
is the share of apprentices within an establishment. As a matter of fact, we find that 
similar to the apprenticeship dummy the share of apprentices is significant in two of 
the three equations of the multinomial logit model and additionally turns out to be 
jointly significant considering all equations ( 29.152  , 001.0p ). The estimates of 
equation (8) using the share of apprentices as exclusion restriction in (6) instead of 
the apprenticeship dummy are displayed in the last column of Table 2. 
 
All in all, the estimation results are very similar to those displayed in Table 1. Hence, 
the estimates appear to be robust to the choice of the exclusion restriction. Most im-
portantly, the relative productivity loss associated with using the flexibility strategy 
remains quite stable at about 14 %.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we empirically investigate the performance effects of different firm 
strategies potentially underlying the use of temporary agency workers (TAWs). Spe-
cifically, we address the issue of whether there are performance differences between 
establishments using TAWs for flexibility reasons and establishments that use these 
workers for screening purposes. For this purpose, we apply German establishment-
level panel data.  
 
Our findings suggest that establishments using TAWs as a flexibility buffer perform 
significantly worse than establishments using TAWs as a screening device. This could 
be explained by the fact that the former explicitly do not offer the opportunity of 
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long-term employment perspectives to their TAWs. Such establishments are therefore 
vulnerable to adopt a system of first- and second-class employees among their work-
force with permanent workers belonging to the privileged group and TAWs being 
assigned to the disadvantaged group of second-class workers. In building such a seg-
mented labour market employers may therefore suffer from their unequal treatment 
of workers who actually should cooperate with each other. If TAWs feel disadvan-
taged relative to the core workers their motivation is likely to be crowded out, so es-
tablishment performance itself might be negatively affected.  
 
The key result of our study implies important recommendations for establishments 
using the services of temporary work agencies by employing TAWs. Although the 
screening strategy is not unlikely to involve a threatening scenario for permanent 
workers, the incentive effect for TAWs participating in the up-or-out tournament 
obviously outweighs the threatening effect. Similarly, the benefits of the flexibility 
strategy, e.g., rapid adjustments to demand fluctuation and cost reductions, appear 
to be outperformed by the drawbacks, which are associated with this strategy, 
namely the motivational problems caused by the formation of a segmented labour 
market within an establishment. In either case, we would advise employers using 
TAWs to follow a screening strategy rather than solely relying on a flexibility strat-
egy. The screening strategy announces the TAWs concerned the opportunity of a 
long-term perspective within the firm and thus avoids the negative consequences of 
internally formed segmented labour markets, which are associated with the imple-
mentation of a system of first- and second-class employees. 
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Table 1 
Productivity effects of TAW employing establishments: Flexibility vs. screening 
strategy. 
Estimation strategy OLS Black-Lynch     approach 
Black-Lynch     
approach, endoge-
neity-corrected 
Estimation equation (1); cross-sectional setting (4) (8) 
FLEX  -0.125*       
(0.063) 
-0.079        
(0.272) 
-0.146**     
(0.021) 
SCREEN  0.002         
(0.979) 
0.148*        
(0.056) 
0.001         
(0.984) 
SCREENFLEX   -0.063         
(0.532) 
0.081         
(0.437) 
-0.047         
(0.609) 
 1|1  STRATEc     -0.080        
(0.236) 
 2|2  STRATEc     0.151***     
(0.000) 
 3|3  STRATEc     0.205***     
(0.000) 
2R  0.840 0.461 0.567 
F  test ( SCREENFLEX  ) 2.27          
(0.132) 
6.39**        
(0.011) 
3.78*         
(0.052) 
F  test ( SCREENFLEXSCREEN  ) 0.33           
(0.565) 
0.32           
(0.569) 
0.22           
(0.637) 
F  test ( SCREENFLEXFLEX  ) 0.32          
(0.574) 
1.92          
(0.165) 
0.94          
(0.332) 
F  test (joint insignificance of the jc )   54.08***     
(0.000) 
Number of observations 746 746 746 
Note: The dependent variable is VAln (column 1) and ivˆ  according to (4) and (8), respectively (col-
umns 2 and 3). * / ** / *** denotes significance at the 10 % / 5 % / 1 % level. The values in pa-
rentheses represent the p -values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The model 
specifications additionally contain a set of control variables (including regional and sector dummies) 
explained in Table A1 and Section 4.1.  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2002-2007, own calculations. 
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Table 2 
Sensitivity checks. 
Dependent variable Yln , ivˆ   WY /ln , ivˆ VAln , ivˆ  VAln , ivˆ  
Estimation strategy 
Black-Lynch  
approach, 
endogeneity-
corrected 
Black-Lynch  
approach, 
endogeneity- 
corrected 
Endogenous 
switching 
regression 
model 
Black-Lynch  
approach, 
endogeneity-
corrected 
Estimation equation (8) (8) (10) (8) 
FLEX  -0.182***    
(0.003) 
-0.137**     
(0.016) 
-0.081    
(0.264) 
-0.137**    
(0.031) 
SCREEN  0.054       
(0.385) 
0.034      
(0.547) 
0.159**      
(0.040) 
0.008       
(0.908) 
SCREENFLEX   0.017       
(0.858) 
0.065       
(0.456) 
0.073       
(0.481) 
-0.040       
(0.662) 
 1|1  STRATEc   -0.082  
(0.235) 
-0.112  
(0.104) 
 -0.072       
(0.160) 
 2|2  STRATEc   0.119*** 
(0.001) 
0.026   
(0.373) 
 0.086     
(0.179) 
 3|3  STRATEc   0.256*** 
(0.000) 
0.091*** 
(0.000) 
 0.263***    
(0.000) 
       -1.439*** 
(0.003) 
 
2R  0.631 0.305 0.468 0.565 
F  test ( SCREENFLEX  ) 10.65***     
(0.001) 
6.38**     
(0.011) 
7.14***      
(0.007) 
3.61*      
(0.057) 
F  test ( SCREENFLEXSCREEN  ) 0.13        
(0.718) 
0.11        
(0.741) 
0.56        
(0.456) 
0.22        
(0.639) 
F  test ( SCREENFLEXFLEX  ) 3.75*       
(0.053) 
4.51**      
(0.034) 
1.79      
(0.181) 
0.91      
(0.339) 
F  test (joint insignificance of the jc ) 58.34*** 
(0.000) 
7.18*** 
(0.000) 
 54.45***     
(0.000) 
Number of observations 833 782 746 746 
Note: * / ** / *** denotes significance at the 10 % / 5 % / 1 % level. The values in parentheses repre-
sent the p -values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The model specifications ad-
ditionally contain a set of control variables (including regional and sector dummies) explained in 
Table A1 and Section 4.1.  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2002-2007, own calculations. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1  
Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables. 
Variable  Definition N Mean Std.dev. Min – Max 
ln VA Natural logarithm of value added 746 16.14 1.73 10.95 – 21.93 
ln Y Natural logarithm of total sales  833 17.12 1.78 11.84 – 23.09 
ln (Y/W) Natural logarithm of total sales divided by 
wage bill 
782 1.64 0.69 -1.15 – 5.48 
FLEX Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment uses temporary agency 
work exclusively as a flexibility device  
746 0.19 0.39 0 – 1 
SCREEN Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment uses temporary agency 
work exclusively as a screening device 
746 0.14 0.35 0 – 1 
FLEX x 
SCREEN 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment uses temporary agency 
work both as a flexibility and screening 
device (dual strategy) 
746 0.07 0.25 0 – 1 
ln K Natural logarithm of total investments 746 12.60 3.95 0 – 20.21 
ln L       Natural logarithm of the number of em-
ployees 
746 5.22 1.36 1.38 – 9.54 
Skilled workers Share of skilled and high skilled workers 
based on regular workforce (%) 
746 71.03 24.11 2.15 – 100 
Female work-
ers 
Share of female employees based on regular 
workforce (%) 
746 24.19 19.18 0 – 95.96 
 
Technical 
status 
Standardized variable originally ranging 
between 1 (establishment uses obsolete 
technologies) and 5 (establishment uses 
state-of-the-art technologies) 
746 0.00 1.00 -2.76 – 1.52 
IT investments  Share of investments in information and 
communication technologies (%) based on 
total investments 
746 0.81 0.39 0 – 1 
Exports Export share on the basis of total sales (%) 746 25.82 29.31 0 – 100 
Product inno-
vations 
Standardized variable originally ranging 
between 0 and 3 indicating the amount of 
product innovation (product improve-
ments, me-too-products, real product inno-
vation)  
746 0.00 1.00 -1.31 – 2.08 
Collective wage 
bargaining 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment commits to collective 
wage bargaining at the industry or estab-
lishment level 
746 0.68 0.46 0 – 1 
Works council Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment has a works council 
746 0.72 0.45 0 – 1 
Establishment 
age 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment is founded before 1990 
746 0.61 0.48 0 – 1 
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Incorporated 
company 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment belongs to an incorpo-
rated firm 
746 0.93 0.25 0 – 1 
Private com-
pany 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment has the legal form of a 
private company 
746 0.05 0.21 0 – 1 
Foreign owner-
ship 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment has a non-domestic owner
746 0.18 0.38 0 – 1 
Organisational 
change 1 
Standardized variable originally ranging 
between 0 and 4; 0 = establishment has 
neither realized outsourcing, spin-offs, 
plant closings, or insourcing within the 
considered time interval; 1 = establishment 
has realized one of those strategies; 2 = 
establishment has realized two of those 
strategies; 3: f establishment has realized 
three of these strategies; 4 = establishment 
has realized all four strategies  
746 0.00 1.00 -0.34 – 5.48 
Organisational 
change 2 
Standardized variable originally ranging 
between 0 and 10 indicating the amount of 
organizational change (e.g., reorganization 
of the supply chain, improvement of qual-
ity management, improvements of ecologi-
cal standards, increasing decentralization, 
introduction of team work, introduction of 
profit centres, and reorganization of de-
partments) 
746 0.00 1.00 -1.34 – 4.17 
Incentive pay Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment offers pay for perform-
ance (stock ownership plans or profit shar-
ing) 
746 0.41 0.49 0 – 1 
Continuous 
training 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment offers or pays for con-
tinuous training 
746 0.88 0.31 0 – 1 
Apprenticeship 
training 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment currently employs ap-
prentices 
746 0.77 0.41 0 – 1 
Apprentices Share of apprentices based on total em-
ployment (%) 
746 4.09 4.99 0 – 62.68 
TEMP Dummy variable indicating whether or not 
an establishment employs temporary 
agency workers 
5,456 0.16 0.37 0 – 1 
Note: N  is number of observations. The calculations are restricted to establishments that do not pro-
vide item non-responses for the regression analyses. In order to save space the information for the 
regional, sector, and time dummies are not displayed.  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2004, own calculations. 
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Table A2  
First-stage regressions. 
Estimation strategy Fixed effects model Multinomial logit model 
Model specification (2) (6) 
  1STRAT  2STRAT  3STRAT  
Kln  0.005           
(0.114) 
0.025    
(0.425) 
-0.021   
(0.577) 
-0.021   
(0.688) 
Lln  0.631***       
(0.000) 
0.273** 
(0.029) 
0.615*** 
(0.000) 
0.492*** 
(0.004) 
Year 2003 -0.003           
(0.904) 
   
Year 2004 0.049**         
(0.048) 
   
Year 2005 0.078***       
(0.004) 
   
Year 2006 0.166***       
(0.000) 
   
Year 2007 0.211***       
(0.000) 
   
Apprenticeship training  -0.532* 
(0.068) 
-1.056*** 
(0.002) 
0.196    
(0.673) 
2R  (overall) / Pseudo- 2R  0.802 0.118 
2  (joint insignificance of Ap-
prenticeship training) 
 11.99***                           (0.007) 
Number of observations 3,552 746 
Number of groups 746    
Note: The dependent variable is VAln  (fixed effects model) or ijP  (multinomial logit model), respec-
tively. * / ** / *** denotes significance at the 10 % / 5 % / 1 % level. The values in parentheses 
represent the p-values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The multinomial logit 
model additionally contains a set of control variables (including regional and sector dummies) ex-
plained in Table A1 and Section 4.1. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2002-2007, own calculations. 
